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Abstract
In this paper we consider tandem error control coding and cryptography in the setting of the wiretap
channel due to Wyner. In a typical communications system a cryptographic application is run at a layer
above the physical layer and assumes the channel is error free. However, in any real application the
channels for friendly users and passive eavesdroppers are not error free and Wyner’s wiretap model
addresses this scenario. Using this model, we show the security of a common cryptographic primitive,
i.e. a keystream generator based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR), can be strengthened by
exploiting properties of the physical layer. A passive eavesdropper can be made to experience greater
difficulty in cracking an LFSR-based cryptographic system insomuch that the computational complexity
of discovering the secret key increases by orders of magnitude, or is altogether infeasible. This result is
shown for two fast correlation attacks originally presented by Meier and Staffelbach, in the context of
channel errors due to the wiretap channel model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally communication systems have implemented security measures by cryptographic means.
However, with the introduction of the wiretap channel model by Wyner [1], it became clear that security
can also be achieved through means of channel coding. The wiretap channel model portrays two friendly
users sharing information over a main communications channel cm (e.g. a fading wireless channel [2])
and a passive eavesdropper observing a degraded version of the information through a wiretap channel
cw. As in [1], we will assume that both channels are discrete and memoryless. Fig. 1 portrays this scenario
using binary symmetric channel (BSC) models for both cm and cw. If the communication over cm is of
a private nature, it then becomes necessary to accomplish two seemingly conflicting tasks of reliability
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Fig. 1. Portrayal of a known-plaintext attack on the wiretap channel model where two friendly parties share information over
a main channel cm and an eavesdropper observes communications through a wiretap channel cw . In practice the keystream
generator is comprised of M LFSR output sequences combined according to a function f . It is simplified from its true condition
and modeled as a single LFSR with a BSC.
between the friendly users and security against the eavesdropper through some encoding technique. The
purpose of this paper is to quantify the additional complexity that the eavesdropper faces when the
security problem is addressed with channel errors at the physical layer in mind.
The existence of codes providing reliability to friendly parties while maintaining some level of con-
fidentiality is crucial to increasing necessary computations for an eavesdropper, and has been proven
by Wyner in [1] as well as Csiszar and Corner in [3]. Practical codes of this kind, however, were not
discovered until much later [4]. It has since been shown for many varying circumstances and channels
that practical codes exist which satisfy both design constraints of reliability and secrecy. For example, it
has been shown in [5] that practical low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes exist which achieve these two
criteria for a noiseless channel cm and a binary erasure channel cw. Similar results have been shown in
[6], also making use of LDPC codes as well as multilevel coding for the case of independent quasi-static
fading channels cm and cw. In this paper we address a practical scenario where both cm and cw are treated
as BSCs with probabilities of a bit flip pm and pw, respectively. It is assumed that the wiretap channel
quality is less than that of the main channel, that is pw > pm. This might be the case, for example,
in a zoned-security application where the friendly parties are inside a building and the eavesdropper is
outside the building monitoring communications.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. First we give some discussion on the general setting. We
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focus our attention on linear feedback shift register (LFSR) cryptographic applications because attacks
against them have been well documented and we are able to quantify the increase in complexity that the
eavesdropper experiences due to errors in the wiretap channel. Two well-known attacks originally given
in [7] will be considered, and it will be shown that an eavesdropper can be made to fail in obtaining the
secret key in an otherwise successful scenario by considering the effects of channel errors presented by
some physical means. The background for the LFSR-based cryptography is given in section II, while the
attacks are presented briefly in section III. Afterwards, section IV provides evidence of a physical-layer
of security under the conditions of the attacks presented in the previous section. Theoretical results as
well as simulation output for the two attacks are also included in this section. Finally conclusions of
these findings are provided in section V.
II. BACKGROUND
It has been shown by Shannon and others that a one-time pad can achieve perfect secrecy as a
cryptographic encoding technique [8], meaning that knowing the codeword or encoded sequence gives
no information on the value of the original message. However, implementation of a one-time pad relies
on a perfectly random key sequence. Assuming that a user is capable of generating this sequence of
elements, the problem of communicating with absolute secrecy can be solved, but at the expense of
requiring distribution of a secret key which is the same length as the original message [9].
Due to the issue of key distribution inherent in the one-time pad encoding mechanism, other methods
are used to attempt to emulate the secrecy aspects of the one-time pad while providing a more practical
key length. One such system is given in [7], [10], [11], and [12]. The encoder for this system is comprised
of a keystream generator that produces a pseudorandom key sequence (zn) by combining M LFSR output
sequences using a function f . The notation (zn) = (z0, z1, . . .) denotes a sequence or vector whose nth
element is zn. Assuming all data sequences to be binary, a ciphertext bit sequence (sn) is produced
using a bit-wise exclusive or (XOR) operation between the message sequence (mn) and the keystream
sequence (zn), as portrayed in Fig. 1. The sequence (an) is the output sequence of a single LFSR, say
the ith one. The effective key of the system consists of the initial conditions of the M shift registers,
and hence is fixed in length regardless of the length of (mn). Decoding is accomplished using the XOR
operation with the same keystream sequence (zn), which friendly parties can duplicate once they know
the key. If it is assumed that the bits of (zn) are random independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.),
and therefore that bits in the sequence cannot be predicted by an eavesdropper, then the system achieves
the secrecy of the one-time pad.
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This assumption is untrue, however, in many instances. For example, Siegenthaler showed using only
ciphertext that the secret key (initial state) of a contributing LFSR can be obtained by calculating a
correlation metric for all possible initial conditions of the LFSR, and then comparing to a Neyman-
Pearson threshold determined by the statistics of the data [10]. While this particular attack requires 2k−1
correlation calculations, fast-correlation techniques exist where it is shown that a low-weight connection
polynomial of an LFSR, i.e. one with a small number of feedback loops, produces a more susceptible
system to correlation methods [7], [11]. Despite the shortcomings of LFSR-based generators, they continue
to be used in modern cryptographic systems, including E0 the system employed by Bluetooth [13]. This
is the case due to the relative ease in computations that an LFSR-based system provides. Many wireless
and handheld technologies benefit from LFSR-based cryptography.
The attack of the LFSR-based cryptographic primitive assumes that the keystream sequence (zn) is
correlated to the output sequence of the ith LFSR (an) with correlation value 1 − p1, and thus can be
modeled as a BSC with Pr (aj 6= zj) = p1 for j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, where N is taken to be the length of
an observed sequence. Fig. 1 shows this modeling of the keystream generator. A known-plaintext attack
is portrayed in the figure where an eavesdropper has some means of obtaining N bits of the original
message; therefore, if the sequence (sn) is observed without error, then the first N bits of the keystream
sequence (zn) can be reconstructed exactly. It is assumed that pw > pm implying more errors in the
wiretap channel than in the main channel; therefore, an encoding technique is chosen to guarantee reliable
communications between friendly parties while maintaining some percentage of bit errors in the wiretap
channel. The effective error rate after applying error control coding (ECC) in the wiretap channel is given
as p2, and the model considered for the eavesdropper is simplified to that shown in Fig. 2. This figure
indicates a pair of BSCs, where the first models the correlation of the sequences (an) and (zn), and
the second models bit errors in the wiretap channel after channel decoding. The output sequence of the
final BSC (yn) is obtained in practice by applying the N known bits of (mn) to the decoded sequence
as shown in Fig. 1. This sequence can be thought of as a noisy version of (an), with a single BSC
separating the two sequences. The probability of a bit flip in this BSC is denoted p′ and is calculated to
be
p′ = p1(1− p2) + (1− p1)p2 = p1 + p2 − 2p1p2. (1)
The cryptographic system is said to be compromised if an eavesdropper can obtain the initial contents
of the ith LFSR using (yn) assuming knowledge of the LFSR connection polynomial is public.
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Fig. 2. Wiretap channel model flow diagram relating sequences (an), (zn), and (yn) using a pair of binary symmetric channels.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS
Both attacks presented in [7] reconstruct the key of the ith LFSR using checks which are derived
from the feedback polynomial g(x). This polynomial governs the structure of the LFSR, and guarantees
a maximal-length output sequence before repeating if and only if g(x) = g0+ g1x+ g2x2+ · · ·+ gkxk is
primitive in GF(2), where gj ∈ {0, 1} for j = 0, 1, . . . , k [14]. Define t to be the number of feedback loops
in the LFSR. For primitive g(x) of order k, g0 = gk = 1 and the total number of nonzero coefficients
of g(x) is odd [7], thus providing an even value of t (gk does not feed back). Let the indices of the
nonzero coefficients in g(x) be denoted j0, j1, . . . , jt; then j0 = 0 and jt = k. Now consider the jth bit
of the sequence (an). Due to the structure of g(x), aj+j0 + aj+j1 + · · · + aj+jt = 0. This expression is
calculated in GF(2), and thus simplifies to
aj = aj+j1 + aj+j2 + · · · + aj+jt. (2)
Except for those within t bits of the end of the sequence, every bit can be expected to contribute to
t+1 checks of this kind. Additional checks are generated using a rule sometimes referred to as freshman
exponentiation which states that for elements x and y in GF(2), (x+y)2 = x2+y2 [14]. Check expressions
given by (2) can then be repeatedly squared until limited by the length of the sequence N , providing
additional check expressions with each squaring. Both attacks rely on computing these checks using the
bits of (yn), and counting checks which hold with equality. Of course a check can still hold if an even
number of bits in a check expression have been flipped, hence bits are assigned conditional probabilities
of being correct given the number of satisfied checks. These probabilities are stored in the vector (p∗n).
Let the number of satisfied checks containing yj be denoted as cjs, while the number of total checks for
which yj plays a role is expressed as cjto. If cjs = h and c
j
to = m, then
p∗j = Pr (yj = aj|c
j
s = h, c
j
to = m)
= p
′sh(1−s)m−h
p′sh(1−s)m−h+(1−p′)(1−s)hsm−h ,
(3)
where s is defined as the probability that an even number of errors occur in the bits of the check expression
discounting yj [7]. This value can be calculated recursively as s(j) = (1− p′)s(j − 1) + p′(1− s(j − 1))
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where s(1) = 1− p′ and s = s(t).
A. Attack A
The first attack in [7] is founded on the principle that bits which satisfy the most checks are the most
reliable. Using the k bits which have the greatest values in (p∗n), a system of equations is determined
and solved where the solution is the key or initial contents of the LFSR. This system of equations is
constructed using the fact that every output of an LFSR is merely a linear combination of the bits in
the initial state. The key is obtained by solving the system using a method such as LU decomposition
tailored to operations in GF(2) [15]. Measures must be taken to ensure that the group of k bits chosen
have linearly independent key bit combinations.
In order to determine whether the obtained solution is the key, a threshold for a correlation metric
between (yn) and a sequence generated by the solution to the system of equations must be formed [10]. If
the solution is determined to be incorrect by the threshold comparison, the algorithm must then perform
an exhaustive search on possible error combinations in the k chosen bits. The calculations necessary
to perform this task dominate the performance of the algorithm, and hence define the computational
complexity of attack A. Variations of the k bits with Hamming distance 1,2,. . . ,k are tried until a key is
found which satisfies the correlation condition. In order to calculate a worst-case scenario, it is assumed
that the eavesdropper is always able to detect a correct key.
B. Attack B
The second attack presented in [7] also makes use of the conditional probabilities (p∗n); however,
the iterative nature of this attack alters these calculations slightly. Attack B is extremely comparable to
Gallager’s LDPC decoding algorithm [16]. In the attack all conditional probabilities in the sequence (p∗n)
are calculated using (3). A threshold pthr is derived by calculating the best possible increase in correct
bits assuming that all bits with probability less than the threshold are flipped. This correction threshold
is set to the value where any bit yj with p∗j < pthr has a maximum likelihood of being incorrect. If a
certain predetermined number of bits Nthr have values in (p∗n) less than pthr, then those bits are flipped.
Otherwise the conditional probabilities p∗j for j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 are recalculated by exchanging the a
priori probability p′ with the previous value of p∗j in (3). After a few iterations of probabilities, or once
at least Nthr untrustworthy bits are found, the bits are flipped and the algorithm continues in this way
until a solution is obtained.
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IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT WITH SIMULATION RESULTS
If a channel encoding technique can guarantee bit errors for a passive eavesdropper regardless of ECC,
then these errors can clearly contribute to the overall security of the system. The questions then remain
of how to quantify the amount of security gained, and what value of p2 will prevent an eavesdropper
from gaining advantage in a correlation-based attack. To provide answers to these two questions, metrics
used in [7] are analyzed. First in the case of attack A, suppose there are exactly r errors in the k chosen
bits. Then the maximum number of iterations in an exhaustive search is
A(k, r) =
r∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
≤ 2H(r/k)k. (4)
The inequality makes use of the binary entropy function H(x), and is well known. Of course r is not
readily available in practice, but it can be estimated making use of (3) in the expression r¯ = k(1 −
Pr (yj = aj |c
j
s = h
′, c
j
to = m
′)), where m′ is the average number of checks relevant to any one bit, and
h′ is the maximum integer such that k bits exist which are expected to satisfy at least h′ checks. Therefore,
given that the best k bits are chosen, r¯ of them are still expected to be in error. An estimate on an upper
bound of the number of trials required is then given as 2H(r¯/k)k.
Fig. 3 shows this bound for varying p2 values in an example featuring a length-32 LFSR while assuming
that N = 32× 106 bits of (mn) are known by the eavesdropper. The greater the length of the observed
data sequence, the easier the system will yield to a correlation-based attack. Simulations of the attack are
compared with this bound and can be seen in Fig. 4, although for a shorter LFSR. Both the theoretical
bounds and the simulations show channel conditions where attacks are expected to require a significant
amount of additional computations due to nonzero p2. As shown in Fig. 4, the expected bound is much
tighter for smaller p′ values. Clearly as p′ approaches 0.5, attack A reverts to a brute-force attack which is
expected to require 2k−1 iterations, while the bound approaches 2k. For smaller p′ the difference between
the bound and the simulation results is not as pronounced. Regardless of this difference, when k is large
and p′ is close to 0.5 the task of finding the secret key becomes overwhelmingly expensive, and not
feasible in many cases. Physical-layer considerations can be addressed in the choice of channel codes
which can then drive p′ to 0.5 by increasing p2, and thus obtain this extra level of security.
A similar analysis can be conducted for attack B; however, the attack has an underlying bipartite graph
which connects check nodes to probabilities in (p∗n). Since the graph contains many cycles, after a few
iterations probabilities become difficult to track; thus numbers of computations are likewise difficult to
estimate. The strength of this attack is instead calculated by determining the effect of the first iteration
of the algorithm. Recall that a threshold pthr was determined to maximize the probability that yj 6= aj
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Fig. 3. Expected bound on the number of trials required to find the secret key using attack A for k = 32, N = k × 106, and
t = 6.
given that p∗j < pthr. Let Nw be the expected number of bits such that both aj 6= yj and p∗j < pthr,
and let Nv be the expected number of bits such that aj = yj and p∗j < pthr, for j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
Also let Ni = Nw −Nv. If Nc0 represents the total number of bits such that aj = yj prior to iteration,
then the toggling of all bits with p∗j < pthr will result in an expected Nc0 +Ni correct bits. Obviously
if Ni is negative, then the expected outcome of the first iteration will leave more bits in error than were
originally so.
The only way to ensure that the algorithm does not eventually converge on the correct sequence is
to insist that attack B have no correction capability. While this would be impossible to guarantee under
every scenario, we say that attack B has correction capability zero if Ni < 0, i.e. Nv > Nw. The ratio
C =
Ni
Nw +Nv
(5)
is used to scale the value of Ni to a real number in the range [−1, 1] while maintaining its sign. Fig.
5 shows the value of the correction ratio C for several BSC parameters p2, over a range of p1 values.
It should be noted that while a negative value of C implies a correction capability of zero, conditions
yielding positive C values still may not converge on the correct sequence. Simulations of attack B have
been consistent in a lack of convergence for cases where C ≤ 0.
An example is in order. Let the primitive connection polynomial for the ith LFSR be written as
g(x) = x31 + x21 + x12 + x3 + x2 + x + 1 [17], and the correlation between (an) and (zn) be 0.8,
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Fig. 4. Results from simulations of attack A showing necessary computations to crack the LFSR-based cryptographic system.
Here k = 15, N = k × 100, and t = 4.
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TABLE I
SIMULATION RESULTS OF ATTACK B COMPARING SCENARIOS WITH AND WITHOUT ADDED SECURITY DUE TO THE
PHYSICAL LAYER. FOR THESE SIMULATIONS, k = 31, N = k × 100, t = 6, AND p1 = 0.2.
Case 1: p2 = 0 Case 2: p2 = 0.1
Number of Total Number of Total
Round bits flipped correct bits bits flipped correct bits
1 30 2487 1 2276
2 91 2526 3 2277
3 122 2586 6 2277
4 42 2628 8 2275
5 50 2676 11 2268
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
14 43 3075 2 2204
15 23 3098 100 2164
16 2 3100 4 2164
.
.
. - -
.
.
.
.
.
.
34 - - 1 2079
35 - - 0 2079
.
.
. - - 0 2079
implying p1 = 0.2. In the first of two cases p2 = 0, meaning the eavesdropper is able to decode all
channel errors in the wiretap channel using ECC, thus p′ = p1 = 0.2 and the correction ratio C is
calculated using (5) to be 0.826. Case two assumes that p2 = 0.1 indicating an error rate of 10 percent
in (yn) which yields p′ = 0.26 by (1), and C = −0.034 by (5). Due to these values of C , it is expected
that attack B will succeed in case one and fail in case two. Comparisons of the attacks are shown in
Tab. I, where it is seen that case one converges on the correct output sequence in 16 rounds. Case two,
however, requires 34 rounds before the algorithm stagnates and fails, a majority of rounds resulting in
more bits in error than the previous round. Clearly an eavesdropper has been made to fail in an otherwise
successful scenario due to the increased security inherent in the system which can be produced by wise
implementation of channel coding.
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the wiretap channel model has been used to show security enhancements for wireless
applications by considering the channel coding problem and the cryptography problem in tandem. These
enhancements occur due to effects in the physical layer of a communications system. For a variety of
applications where an eavesdropper experiences worse channel conditions than those between friendly
parties, proper implementation of channel coding can ensure an increased difficulty in cracking crypto-
graphic systems by preserving bit errors in the wiretap channel due to the physical layer. This principle
was shown using an LFSR-based cryptographic system which is susceptible to correlation attacks in some
cases. It has been shown using theory and simulations for two different attacks that channel coding can
be used to either increase the difficulty of the attack or make it altogether impossible, thus providing a
physical layer of security to the system.
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